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Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of
1986: Till Congress Do Us Part
I. INTRODUCTION
Society traditionally favors married persons over single persons.'
Reflecting this societal preference, the Supreme Court of the United
States has consistently held that the right to marry is a fundamental
right.2 Similarly, Congress has authorized the Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service (INS) to give preferential treatment to aliens on
the basis of marriage.3 Immediate relatives (including spouses) of
American citizens4 or lawful permanent residents automatically qual-
ify for immigrant visas and permanent residency.' Because of this
1. Married persons are afforded preferential status and benefits in numerous areas of the
law including taxation and trusts and estates. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6013 (1986) (allowing joint
filing of tax returns by married persons, which effectively splits the earned income).
2. See infra notes 152-61 and accompanying text.
3. Subsection (b) of section 1151 exempts immediate relatives from numerical limitations
on immigrant visas. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1982); see also Fraudulent Marriage and Fiance
Arrangements to Obtain Permanent Resident Status: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 6
(1985) [hereinafter Hearings on Marriage Fraud] (statement of Alan C. Nelson, INS
Commissioner).
4. Although the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Marriage Fraud
Amendments refer to American citizens as United States citizens, such persons shall be named
"American citizens" for purposes of this article.
5. The end result of marriage to an American citizen is total exemption from numerical
limitations on visas issued. If not for this privilege, the alien spouse would be subject to such
quotas. If he or she did not fit another preferential category, the alien spouse most likely
would not be able to enter the United States at all. Section 201(a) of the INA states:
Exclusive of special immigrants defined in section 1101(a)(27) of this title,
immediate relatives specified in subsection (b) of this section, and aliens who are
admitted or granted asylum under section 1157 or 1158 of this title, the number
of aliens born in any foreign state or dependent area who may be issued
immigrant visas or who may otherwise acquire the status of an alien lawfully
admitted to the United States for permanent residence, shall not in any of the
first three quarters of any fiscal year exceed a total of seventy-two thousand and
shall not in any fiscal year exceed two hundred and seventy thousand: Provided,
That to the extent that in a particular fiscal year the number of aliens who are
issued immigrant visas or who may otherwise acquire the status of aliens lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, and who are subject to the numerical
limitations of this section, together with the aliens who adjust their status to
aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence pursuant to subparagraph (H)
of section 1101(a)(27) of this title or section 19 of the Immigration and
Nationality Amendments Act of 1981, exceed the annual numerical limitation in
effect pursuant to this section for such year, the Secretary of State shall reduce to
such extent the annual numerical limitation in effect pursuant to this section for
the following fiscal year.
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patent advantage, marriage is the most frequently stated ground in
petitions for permanent residency.' Not all petitions are legitimate,
however. Indeed, the INS has suggested that fraud plays a role in
30% of all immigration visa petitions based on marriage to an Ameri-
can citizen. 7 Even the president of the American Immigration Law-
yers Association concedes that fraud is present in some immigration-
related marriages, although he estimates the frequency of fraud at one
or two percent 8
In 1986, as part of a major reformation of the immigration sys-
tem, Congress enacted the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amend-
ments.9 Although Congress continues to emphasize and reward
familial unity,'° it has placed new restrictions on the benefits of mari-
8 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1982).
Section 201(b) of the INA states:
(b) The "immediate relatives" referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall
mean the children, spouses, and parents of a citizen of the United States: Pro-
vided, That in the case of parents, such citizen must be at least twenty-one years
of age. The immediate relatives specified in this subsection who are otherwise
qualified for admission as immigrants shall be admitted as such, without regard
to the numerical limitations in this chapter.
8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1982).
Visas for spouses of lawful permanent residents may be obtained by virtue of section
203(a)(2) of the INA which states:
Visas shall next be made available, in a number not to exceed 26 per centum of
the number specified in section 1151(a) of this title, plus any visas not required
for the classes specified in paragraph (1) of this subsection, to qualified immi-
grants who are the spouses, unmarried sons or unmarried daughters of an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2) (1982).
6. Hearings on Marriage Fraud, supra note 3, at 7. Statistics provided through the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) show that total immigration to the United
States decreased 9.6% from fiscal year 1978 to fiscal year 1984, but that the number of
immigrants who obtained permanent resident status based on marriage to American citizens
increased 43% from fiscal year 1978 to fiscal year 1984. Id. at & It also has been estimated
that while American marriages increased 60% between 1962 and 1984, immigration-related
marriages increased 600% in that same time frame. Id. at 57 (statement of David S. North,
Director, Center for Labor and Migration Studies, New Transcentury Foundation).
7. H.R. REP. No. 906, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5978 (1986).
8. Hearings on Marriage Fraud, supra note 3, at 78 (statement of Jules Coven, President
of the American Immigration Lawyers Association). As indicated by the conflicting evidence,
the magnitude of the sham marriage problem remains the subject of much debate. See Note,
The Constitutionality of the INS Sham Marriage Investigation Policy, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1238,
1239-41 (1986) (discussing the debate over sham marriages).
9. Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat.
3537 (to be codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) [hereinafter IMFA]. The Amendments
were instituted as part of an overall attempt to control the borders of the United States, and to
provide an efficient solution to the problems of those aliens who are already present in the
United States.
10. H.R. REP. No. 906, supra note 7, at 6.
MARRIAGE FRAUD
tal status in order to deter marriage fraud in immigration petitions.I1
The most intrusive and burdensome of the Amendments' restrictions
requires an alien who marries during deportation or exclusion pro-
ceedings to leave the United States for two years before the INS will
approve his or her petition for immediate relative status. 12
Because an alien who marries an American citizen or lawful per-
manent resident is entitled to preferential status, the motive of an
alien who marries while facing exclusion or deportation is suspect.
Certainly not all aliens who marry during proceedings have fraudu-
lent motives. The Amendments, however, do not give the alien the
opportunity to prove that his or her marriage is valid despite its
timing.
Under the Amendments, an alien who marries before proceed-
ings begin is entitled to prove the validity of his or her marriage to
qualify for conditional status.13 If conditional status is granted, the
alien is permitted to stay in the United States. Two years later, the
alien qualifies for permanent resident status if the marriage is deemed
valid. 1
Conversely, the Amendments create a presumption of invalidity
for an alien who marries during proceedings. Such aliens are required
to leave the U.S. for two years.1" Aliens who marry during proceed-
ings are not afforded the same legal process as those who marry before
proceedings. They are arguably deprived of all process because of the
presumed invalidity of their marriages.
Further, the Amendments may raise an equal protection issue
because they differentiate between aliens who marry during proceed-
ings and those who marry before their inception. Both groups must
remain married for two years to indirectly prove the validity of their
marriages, but only those who marry during proceedings must leave
the country for this time period. Those aliens may then face an addi-
tional two years "conditional" residency period. The Amendments
also impinge on the American spouse's constitutional right to marry.
Nevertheless, the Amendments will probably withstand a due process
or equal protection challenge because of the broad range of discretion
Congress traditionally enjoys in immigration and naturalization
matters.
11. Id. In reality, the Amendments represent the latest attempt to deter immigration
related marriage fraud. The use of fraud in attempts to enter the United States has always
evoked great consternation; the effort to prevent such use has always been inefficient.
12. IMFA § 5 (amending INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1982)).
13. IMFA § 2(a) (adding § 216(a)(1) to the INA).
14. IMFA § 2(a) (adding § 216(c)(3)(B) to the INA).
15. IMFA § 5.
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The section that follows addresses the underlying problem of
marriage fraud, and thus provides the background for the passage of
the Amendments. The next section discusses the substantive provi-
sions of the Amendments and the problems of implementation. The
final section posits that the Amendments force a collision between
Congress' plenary power over immigration and the constitutional
rights of aliens and their American spouses.
II. MARRIAGE AND IMMIGRATION BEFORE THE AMENDMENTS
A. Types of Marriage Fraud
Marriage fraud in the immigration context includes contractual
fraud, which is conspiratorial in nature, and one-sided marriage
fraud, which is unilateral in nature. In contractual fraud,16 an Ameri-
can citizen receives money to marry an alien. Fees generally range
from $3,000 to $5,000, but in some cases may exceed $20,000.17
Underground organizations known as "marriage sham rings"" pro-
vide a supply of potential spouses, and help the parties avoid detec-
16. This type of fraud involves both the alien and the United States citizen or lawful
permanent resident. Both parties knowingly agree to marry for one purpose-immigration of
the alien to the United States. Written prenuptial agreements are not unusual where the
contracting parties stipulate to the dissolution of the marriage at the earliest possible point in
time and to absolve the United States citizen of any debts that the alien spouse may accrue.
Hearings on Marriage Fraud, supra note 3, at 17-18 (statement of Alan C. Nelson, INS
Commissioner). An interesting question surrounds these prenuptial agreements-could the
courts find such agreements voidable because contrary to public policy, that policy being
opposed to a fraudulent marriage for immigration purposes?
17. Id. at 13 (statement of Alan C. Nelson, INS Commissioner).
18. Some examples of recently broken sham marriage rings:
(1) A Los Angeles attorney was convicted on 16 counts of conspiracy and fraud, along with 6
co-conspirators, for arranging marriages between Filipinos and United States citizens. The
attorney is believed to be responsible for arranging 50 such sham marriages, charging the
aliens between $3,000 and $5,000.
(2) A New York city attorney was disbarred for lying and fabricating addresses for alien
clients in order to secure quick divorces. The INS uncovered over 260 fraudulent divorce
cases.
(3) A Del Rio, Texas notary public was convicted for arranging "thousands" of sham
marriages over a 10-year period. A Mexican attorney was also prosecuted for participating in
the Del Rio scheme.
(4) In Lafayette, Louisiana, a donut shop manager and 24 other individuals were indicted on
charges of conspiracy and making false statements. The sham ring focused on students at
nearby universities.
(5) In Belle Glade, Florida, authorities broke up a marriage ring run by a minister. The
illegal Haitians involved paid up to $10,000 for the filing of immigration petitions.
(6) In Kansas City, Kansas, seven Nigerians were indicted for taking part in sham marriages.
The purpose of marriage to United States citizens was not only to qualify for immigration
benefits, but also to qualify for guaranteed student loans and lower tuition rates, food stamps,
and subsidized housing.
Id. at 15-16 (statement of Alan C. Nelson, INS Commissioner).
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tion.' 9 Financial gain is a primary motivation, but the American
citizen who agrees to participate in a fraudulent marriage may act on
other motives. Many Americans participate in contractual fraud
because they sympathize with aliens facing deportation.2" Others
assist aliens illegally because they oppose numerical restrictions on
immigration.2" Some feel pressure to do "a favor" for a friend or
business acquaintance.22 Contractual fraud can also be self-perpetuat-
ing; roles reverse. An alien attains permanent resident status by mar-
rying an American, and then agrees to marry another alien after
terminating the earlier marriage.23
In "one-sided marriage fraud, ' 24 a convincing and seemingly
devoted alien induces an unsuspecting American citizen or permanent
resident into marriage. Once the alien achieves permanent residency,
he or she unceremoniously abandons the American spouse.25 Often,
aliens choose to marry United States servicemen stationed abroad; the
additional inducement is that spouses of United States servicemen can
apply for naturalization immediately upon marriage to an American
citizen.26
B. Immediate Relative and Second Preference Status
Marrying an American citizen entitles the alien to "immediate
relative" status,2 and exempts him or her from the numerical limita-
tions on immigrant visas. Marrying a lawful permanent resident
entitles the alien to second preference status.29 Because of the liberal
ceilings placed on second preference visas, an alien who marries a
lawful permanent resident possibly may enjoy the same preference as
19. Id. at 14.
20. Id. at 13.
21. Id. at 14.
22. Id. at 13. The element of coercion, initially applied by parents or friends of the
American citizen to help the alien, can then be shifted to coercion by the alien after the
marriage has taken place. Threats of violence, actual violence, extortion, and blackmail can be
used to intimidate the American citizen or permanent resident from alerting the authorities of
the fraudulent marriage because of the possibility of criminal or civil sanctions. Id. at 13-14.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 14.
25. Id. Often the alien spouse is concealing a prior undissolved marriage. The alien
spouse will now apply for a second preference visa for the real spouse. This can involve a
"sham divorce" on the part of the alien who then fraudulently marries an American citizen.
The alien also can pose as another person with forged birth documentation or as a dead
American citizen whose death cannot be traced. Id. at 12.
26. Id. at 17; see INA § 319(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1430(b) (1982).
27. See INA § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1982); 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a) (1987).
28. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
29. See INA § 203(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2) (1982).
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an alien who marries an American citizen. 30
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) delineates the pro-
cedure for adjustment of status based on marriage to an American
citizen or lawful permanent resident.31 Following the procedure, the
nonalien spouse petitions the INS to grant the alien immediate rela-
tive or second preference status. The INS then investigates the valid-
ity of the marriage.32 If the alien proves that the marriage is valid,33
30. Congress has allocated 26% of all preference petitions for second preference aliens,
totalling 70,200 plus any visas not used by the first preference. Currently, however, there is a
16-month waiting period. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
31. INA § 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (1982).
32. Section 101(a)(35) of the INA provides one vague reference to types of marriages that
are prohibited. It is the only section that defines marriage for immigration purposes in any
way. It reads as follows: "The term 'spouse', 'wife', or 'husband' does not include a spouse,
wife, or husband by reason of any marriage ceremony where the contracting parties thereto are
not physically present in the presence of each other, unless the marriage shall have been
consummated." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(35) (1982).
The definition of a bona fide or valid marriage for immigration purposes has been a source
of great discussion in the courts. The courts have made it clear that it is only necessary that
the parties have a valid intent to marry. The marriage is not required to be viable. In
Whetstone v. INS, the court stated:
We find no requirement in the statute that .. . a marriage, once lawfully
performed according to state law, is to be deemed insufficient proof of "a valid
marriage" merely because at some later time the marriage is either terminated, or
the parties separate. The only proof in this case establishes that petitioner's
marriage is not terminated. So far as the record discloses the facts, she is today
married to Whetstone although they are not living together. There is no
requirement that a marriage, entered into in good faith, must last any certain
number of days, months or years. Much less is there any requirement that a
bona fide and lasting marital relationship (whatever that may mean) exists as of
the time the INS questions the validity of the marriage.
561 F.2d 1303, 1306 (9th Cir. 1977). Similarly in Chan v. Bell, a district court noted:
The Immigration and Naturalization Service clearly could not, consistently with
due process of law, be regarded as vested with both the authority to establish the
vague and elusive concept of marriage viability and the enormous power to regu-
late and enforce that concept in actual practice.
464 F. Supp. 125, 130 (D.D.C. 1978). Under section 204(b) of the INA, once the petition for
immediate relative status is filed, it must be approved so long as the Attorney General deter-
mines "that the facts stated in the petition are true and that the alien in behalf of whom the
petition is made is an immediate relative specified in § 1151(b) of this title." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1154(b) (1982). Nowhere is the Attorney General empowered to deny the immediate rela-
tive status based on the viability or solidarity of the marriage. Chan, 464 F. Supp. at 128; see
also Matter of Boromond, 17 I & N Dec. 450 (1980) (no examination of the viability of a
marriage may occur). In addition, no INS rule or regulation requires proof of the viability of a
marriage before approving the immediate relative petition. Id. The Marriage Fraud Amend-
ments do not appear to amend this subsection of section 204. The regulations require only that
a certificate of marriage and proof of legal termination of all prior marriages of both parties
accompany the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2 (1987). Furthermore, 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(l)-(4)
provides for revocation of the petition only upon written withdrawal, the death of either
spouse, or the legal termination of the marriage as husband and wife. 8 C.F.R. § 205. 1(a)(l)-
(4) (1987).
33. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that "Congress did not intend to
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he or she attains immediate relative or second preference status and is
entitled to become a lawful permanent resident.34
The original Act provided no guidelines for identifying a valid or
"bona fide" marriage. Because objective evidence35 is easy to fabri-
cate, courts determined that the bona fides of a marriage depends on
the parties' intent at the time they entered the marriage. 36 During its
investigation, the INS, however, cannot directly determine the subjec-
tive intent of the parties; the INS must assess objective evidence of the
validity of the marriage.37 Lacking guidance, INS district officers
make ad hoc determinations based on their own subjective views of a
"valid" marriage. The results are inescapably inconsistent.39
provide aliens with an easy means of circumventing the quota system by fake marriages in
which neither of the parties ever intended to enter into the marital relationship." Lutwak v.
United States, 344 U.S. 604, 611 (1953).
It should be noted that the Court in Lutwak went on to state that the conduct of the
parties after marriage is relevant only to the extent that it bears upon their subjective state of
mind at the time they were married. Id. at 617. The Ninth Circuit reiterated this sentiment in
Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1975). That court emphasized that the intent of the
parties at the time of their marriage is controlling. "Evidence that the parties separated after
their wedding is relevant in ascertaining whether they intended to establish a life together
when they exchanged marriage vows." Id. at 1202. In McLat v. Longo, however, a district
court commented:
[A] marriage refers to an inter-spousal relationship, not to the mere legal
ceremony celebrating the same. Were it otherwise, the intent and purpose of the
immigration laws would be eroded and frustrated. Whether they should be is a
matter for Congressional determination. That they have not been is indicative of
Congress's satisfaction with their present structure and operation. And this
Court is not about to usurp the legislative function by judicially sanctioning
plaintiffs' beliefs.
412 F. Supp. 1021, 1027 (D.V.I. 1976) (citation omitted).
The opening paragraphs of McLat provide an interesting example of many courts' atti-
tudes toward marriage fraud.
Despite the rigidity of the present [quota preference structure], however, ways
exist to "beat the system".... Not everyone is fortunate enough to be the parent
or child of a United States citizen. But anyone, with a little assistance from
Cupid and/or Mammon, can become a citizen's spouse.
Id. at 1021.
34. See INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1982).
35. Examples of objective evidence may include cohabitation, joint property, tax returns,
and bank accounts. See H.R. REP. No. 906, supra note 7, at 9.
36. See supra notes 32-33.
37. Commissioner Nelson recommended that the Marriage Fraud Amendments include a
clear definition of marriage and the requirements necessary to meet such a definition. Hearings
on Marriage Fraud, supra note 3, at 18. Specifically, Commissioner Nelson recommended that
"[s]ection 101(a)(35) be amended to specify indicia of what constitutes a marriage recognized
for the purposes of conferring an immigration benefit. Such indicia must include cohabitation
after the marriage and after the petition is filed, and viability at the time the permanent benefit
is accorded." Id. at 48; see supra note 2.
38. Section 204(a) of the INA requires only that:
The petition [for immediate relative status] shall be in such form as the Attorney
19871 1093
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE MARRIAGE FRAUD AMENDMENTS
A. Two Year Conditional Permanent Resident Status
Most of the text of the Marriage Fraud Amendments governs the
granting of permanent residency based on marital status. Under the
INA, an alien with immediate relative or second preference status was
entitled to permanent residency.' The Amendments provide for a
conditional permanent residency of two years before the alien attains
permanent permanent resident status.41 This provision of the Amend-
ments only affects aliens who have been married for less than two
years.42
General may by regulations prescribe and shall contain such information and be
supported by such documentary evidence as the Attorney General may require.
8 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (1982).
Section 204(b) of the INA requires an investigation of the facts in each case but does not
provide specificity or guidelines. Section 235(a) of the INA provides for inspection by immi-
gration officers. Pertinent parts of the section are as follows:
The Attorney General and any immigration officer, including special inquiry
officers, shall have power to administer oaths and to take and consider evidence
of or from any person touching the privilege of any alien or person he believes or
suspects to be an alien to enter, reenter, pass through, or reside in the United
States or concerning any matter which is material and relevant to the enforce-
ment of this chapter and the administration of the Service, and, where such
action may be necessary, to make a written record of such evidence .... The
Attorney General and any immigration officer, including special inquiry officers,
shall have power to require by subpena [sic] the attendance and testimony of
witnesses before immigration officers and special inquiry officers and the produc-
tion of books, papers, and documents relating to the privilege of any person to
enter, reenter, reside in, or pass through the United States or concerning any
matter which is material and relevant to the enforcement of this chapter and the
administration of the Service, and to that end may invoke the aid of any court of
the United States.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (1982).
39. This Comment will not address the tangential issue of INS investigatory procedures.
For a discussion of this issue, see generally Note, The Constitutionality of the INS Sham
Marriage Investigation Policy, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1238 (1986).
40. INA § 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (1982).
41. Section 2(a) of the IMFA, adding section 216 to the INA, reads as follows:
(a) CONDITIONAL BASIS FOR PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS BASED ON
RECENT MARRIAGE-Chapter 2 of the Immigration and Nationality Act is
amended by adding at the end the following new section:
"CONDITIONAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS FOR CERTAIN ALIEN SPOUSES
AND SONS AND DAUGHTERS"
Sec. 216. (a) IN GENERAL.-(I) CONDITIONAL BASIS FOR STATUS.-
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, an alien spouse (as defined in
subsection (g)(l)) and an alien son or daughter (as defined in subsection (g)(2))
shall be considered, at the time of obtaining the status of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, to have obtained such status on a conditional
basis subject to the provisions of this section.
IMFA § 2(a) (adding § 216 to the INA).
42. IMFA § 2(a) (adding § 216(g)(1) to the INA).
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The Amendments provide instructions for filing the petition43
and attending the personal interview." The INS must attempt to
notify the petitioning alien and spouse ninety days before the condi-
tional status period ends. 45 The Amendments authorize a hardship
waiver46 if the alien fails to meet the statutory requirements for
removal of the conditional status under this Act. The Attorney Gen-
eral may grant a waiver if deportation would result in hardship, or if
the alien has terminated the marriage for "good cause." '47 In deter-
mining whether a hardship would result, the Attorney General may
43. Section 2(a) of the IMFA, adding section 216(c)(1)(A) to the INA, provides detailed
instructions on the contents and period for filing the petition to remove conditional status.
The petition must state that the qualifying marriage was valid under the laws of the place
where the marriage occurred, has not been judicially annulled or terminated (except through
the death of the spouse) was not entered into fraudulently for purposes of obtaining entry to
the United States, and no fee or consideration was given for the filing of such petition
(excluding any necessary attorney's fees). Additionally, the petitioning spouses must provide a
statement that includes the actual residence and place of employment of each party from the
date the conditional status was granted. The petition must be filed within the 90-day period
prior to the second anniversary of the granting of the conditional status. Section 216(d)(2)(B)
provides for a "good cause" extension of the filing period if the alien can establish to the
satisfaction of the Attorney General good cause and extenuating circumstances. Furthermore,
if an alien finds himself in deportation proceedings as a result of nonfiling within the statutory
time period, the Attorney General may stay such proceedings pending the filing of the petition.
44. Section 2(a) of the IMFA, adding § 216(c)(1)(B) to the INA, requires the Service to
conduct a personal interview with the petitioners within 90 days of filing the petition to remove
conditional status at a time and place convenient to all parties. Again, the Attorney General
may waive the deadline for the personal interview at his discretion.
45. Section 2(a) of the IMFA, adding § 216(a)(2) to the INA, requires that the Attorney
General "shall provide for notice to such [alien] spouse, son, or daughter respecting the
provisions of this section and the requirements of subsection (c)(1) to have the conditional
basis of such status removed" at the time permanent residency is granted on a conditional basis
and on an "attempted" basis, on or about 90 days before the two year conditional residency is
at end. The section also provides that the Attorney General's failure to provide such
notification does not affect the enforcement of other provisions of the Act.
46. Section 2(a) of the IMFA, adding § 216 (c)(4) to the INA, provides for the removal of
the conditional permanent residency status, at the discretion of the Attorney General, for any
alien who has failed to meet the statutory requirements of timely filing of petition and personal
interview, if:
(A) extreme hardship would result if such alien is deported, or, (B) the qualifying
marriage was entered into in good faith by the alien spouse, but the qualifying
marriage has been terminated (other than through the death of the spouse) by the
alien spouse for good cause and the alien was not at fault in failing to meet the
requirements of paragraph (1). In determining extreme hardship, the Attorney
General shall consider circumstances occurring only during the period that the
alien was admitted for permanent residence on a conditional basis.
IMFA § 2(a) (adding § 216(c)(4) to the INA).
47. In light of the emergence of "no fault" divorces, an evidentiary question arises where
grounds for the divorce are not presented. The alien in an immigration proceeding will have
trouble proving that the divorce was granted for "good cause" when the grounds for the
divorce were not divulged. Ingber & Prischet, The Marriage Fraud Amendments, in THE
NEW SIMPSON-RODINO IMMIGRATION LAW OF 1986, at 564-65 (1986).
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only consider events that occurred during the conditional status
period.48
1. DETERMINING THE BONA FIDES OF MARRIAGE
Although Congress did not define a bona fide marriage in affirm-
ative terms, it did list "improper" conditions that disqualify a mar-
riage under the Amendments.4 9 Arguably, any marriage that is not
"improper" under the Amendments is valid for immigration pur-
poses. 50 A marriage is "improper" if the nonalien received a fee or
48. Therefore, the INS cannot consider the fact that the alien is married to a United States
citizen or lawful permanent resident because that marriage took place prior to the conditional
status period. Id.
49. Section 2(a) of the IMFA, adding section 216(b) to the INA, reads as follows:
(b) TERMINATION OF STATUS IF FINDING THAT QUALIFYING MARRIAGE
IMPROPER.- (I) IN GENERAL.-In the case of an alien with permanent resident
status on a conditional basis under subsection (a), if the Attorney General
determines, before the second anniversary of the alien's obtaining the status of
lawful admission for permanent residence, that - (A) the qualifying marriage-
(i) was entered into for the purpose of procuring an alien's entry as an
immigrant, or
(ii) has been judicially annulled or terminated, other than through the
death of a spouse; or
(B) a fee or other consideration was given (other than a fee or other
consideration to an attorney for assistance in preparation of a lawful petition) for
the filing of a petition under section 204(a) or 214(d) with respect to the alien; the
Attorney General shall so notify the parties involved and, subject to paragraph
(2), shall terminate the permanent resident status of the alien (or aliens) involved
as of the date of the determination.
IMFA § 2(a) (adding § 216(b) to the INA).
50. Included in the House Report accompanying the Amendments is a letter from John R.
Bolton, Assistant Attorney General, to Peter Rodino, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, in which Bolton interprets the Amendments as requiring the alien and spouse to
prove they have entered into a bona fide marriage. Bolton reads the Amendments as requiring
four elements be fulfilled for the removal of the conditional status: 1) that the marriage is in
accordance with the laws of the place where the marriage took place; 2) that the marriage has
not been judicially annulled or terminated, except by death of a spouse; 3) that no fee or
consideration has been paid; and 4) that the parties to the marriage have maintained a bona
fide marital relationship. H.R. REP. No. 906, supra note 7, at 9. While the actual language of
the Amendments does include the first three requirements, it does not use the term bona fide in
describing the marital relationship. The Amendments instead state that the parties must show
the marriage "was not entered into for the purpose of procuring an alien's entry as an
immigrant." IMFA § 2(a) (adding § 216(d)(l)(A)(i)(III) to the INA). In other words, Bolton
has apparently concluded that a marriage is bona fide if it has not been entered into for
purposes of evading the immigration laws. Bolton goes on to state that this element could be
proved by providing "evidence of cohabitation, joint property, tax returns and other indices of
marriage." H.R. REP. No. 906, supra note 7, at 9. The Amendments do not establish such
criteria as proof of a bona fide marriage and the INS has not issued any regulations that
provide for such criteria. In commenting on these provisions in the Amendments, Bolton
states that one of the reasons for the Amendments is the courts' and Board of Immigration
Appeals's existing interpretation of what constitutes a marriage. See supra note 33 and
accompanying text. Bolton wants the Amendments to affirmatively state that a marriage must
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consideration, or if it has since been judicially annulled or termi-
nated.51 In addition, the marriage must not have been "entered into
for the purpose of procuring an alien's entry as an immigrant. ' 52 The
latter condition, of course, only restates the question.
Beyond the two year conditional period, the viability of the mar-
riage is not at issue. Once the alien attains permanent resident status,
he or she may terminate the marriage."3 Congress drew the line at
two years, believing that incidents of marriage fraud would substan-
tially decrease if aliens and American spouses knew that they must
maintain the appearance of a valid marital relationship for two years.
2. THE STATUS CONTROVERSY
The provision governing "conditional permanent residency" may
simply mean permanent residency on a conditional basis.54 If so, the
conditional permanent resident enjoys the same rights as the perma-
nent resident, with a condition subsequent that if the marriage does
not remain valid for two years, the alien is not entitled to finalize his
or her status. Conversely, the provision may create a new status
known as conditional permanent resident status. If so, the status of a
conditional permanent resident is qualitatively different from that of
a permanent resident. Consequently, the rights of conditional perma-
nent residents may be undefined.
The relevant provision is entitled "Conditional Permanent Resi-
dent Status for Certain Alien Spouses and Sons and Daughters."55
The text reads in part: "[A]n alien spouse (as defined in subsection
(g)(1)) and an alien son or daughter (as defined in subsection (g)(2))
shall be considered, at the time of obtaining the status of an alien law-
be viable, not simply valid, in order to avoid the same interpretation that validity, and not
viability, is necessary. H.R. REP. No. 906, supra note 7, at 10. It is interesting to note that
both Commissioner Nelson and Assistant Attorney General Bolton recommended that the
Amendments explicitly require viability but Congress did not choose to heed their advice.
51. IMFA § 2(a) (adding § 216(b)(l)(A)(ii) and (1)(B) to the INA).
52. IMFA § 2(a) (adding § 216(b)(1)(A)(i) to the INA).
53. It is the lack of a viability requirement that makes the occurrence of fraudulent
marriages so commonplace. In his statement before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Immigration and Refugee Policy, Commissioner Nelson specifically requested that Congress
make viability a requirement. See Hearings on Marriage Fraud, supra note 3, at 18. In some
respects, the Amendments do require viability by placing the two year conditional status on
the alien's marriage. This, however, is no different from the original INA regulations that
provided for revocation of the petitions for adjustment of status, before the decision on the
petition became final, of any immediate relative alien whose marriage is terminated. The
Amendments do provide for special circumstances, such as the death of the American spouse.
The Amendments also provide a hardship waiver, IMFA § 2(a) (adding § 216(c)(4) to the
INA).
54. Ingber & Prischet, supra note 47, at 556.
55. IMFA § 2(a) (adding § 216(a)(1) to the INA).
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fully admitted for permanent residence, to have obtained such status on
a conditional basis subject to the provisions of this section."5 6 Gener-
ally, when the meaning of the text and the title differ, the text governs.
Because the phrase "conditional permanent resident status" appears
in the title, but not in the text, a court applying this principle of statu-
tory construction should find that the Amendments do not create a
new status.
57
In addition, there are statements in the legislative history of the
Amendments that support the view that Congress did not intend to
create a new status of permanent residents.5 8 For example, during the
House debates over the Amendments, one congressman stated:
Under this legislation we do establish a 2-year conditional
period on that permanent resident status, during which time the
alien spouse may live in this country, work in this country, gets
credit for going toward citizenship in that 3 years and everything
else, just like any other permanent resident alien, except that before
the end of the 2-year period is up, that alien spouse and the Ameri-
can citizen or permanent resident spouse has to apply by a petition
that is sworn to the Attorney General seeking to remove that con-
dition, thereby giving the Immigration Service and Attorney Gen-
eral a chance, a second look at that marriage and to look back and
see if it has been annulled, if they are really still together, if in fact
there was a fraud perhaps perpetrated, and so forth.59
B. Spousal Second Preference Petition
Many aliens seek to obtain permanent resident status through a
fraudulent marriage in order to bring their real spouses into the
United States under a spousal second preference visa.' The alien
divorces his or her alien spouse and fraudulently marries an American
citizen or permanent resident. Once the alien spouse obtains perma-
nent residency, he or she divorces the American citizen or permanent
resident and files a spousal second preference petition for his or her
alien spouse.61
In the Amendments, Congress attempted to deter fraud of this
nature by requiring the alien spouse to wait five years before filing a
56. Id.
57. See Ingber & Prischet, supra note 47, at 557; see also K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON
LAW TRADITION 524 (4th ed. 1969).
58. 132 CONG. REC. 8588-89 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1986) (statement of Rep. McCollum).
59. Id.
60. See Hearings on Marriage Fraud, supra note 3, at 12.
61. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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second preference spousal petition. 62 The Attorney General63 may
waive this waiting period if the alien proves "to the satisfaction of the
Attorney General by clear and convincing evidence that the prior
marriage . . . was not entered into for the purpose of evading any
provision of the immigration laws."' 6 The alien has already met this
burden twice: once to attain conditional permanent resident status,
and again at the end of two years to attain permanent resident status.
This provision is overkill; it unnecessarily and unfairly burdens the
petitioning permanent resident.
C. Fiance Visas
The original Immigration and Nationality Act required that
aliens applying for fiance visas establish a bona fide intention and the
legal capacity to marry within ninety days of arrival in the United
States.65 If the parties married within that period, the alien was enti-
tled to permanent resident status regardless of the viability of the
marriage.66 Consequently, an alien could leave an American spouse
immediately after the marriage and still obtain permanent residency.
The Amendments place an additional condition on fiance visas.
Now the alien and his or her fiance must have "met in person within 2
years before the date of filing the petition."67 This provision reflects a
cultural bias. In some countries, parents arrange their children's mar-
riages; the children do not meet before marriage. Immigrants often
wish to maintain their cultural heritage by continuing this custom.
62. IMFA § 2(c)(2) (amending INA § 204(a), 8 U.S.C. 1154(a) (1982)).
Section 203(a)(2) of the INA provides that "[v]isas shall next be made available ... to
qualified immigrants who are the spouses, unmarried sons or unmarried daughters of an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence." 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2) (1982).
63. The Immigration and Nationality Act and the Marriage Fraud Amendments both
refer to the Attorney General as the proper government official to carry out the provisions of
the Acts. Nevertheless, the Attorney General has delegated that power routinely to the INS
officer in each district.
64. IMFA § 2(c)(2)(A)(ii).
65. INA § 214(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(d) (1982).
66. Section 214(d) of the INA reads:
(d) In the event the marriage between the said alien and the petitioner shall
occur within three months after the entry and they are found otherwise
admissible, the Attorney General shall record the lawful admission for
permanent residence of the alien and minor children as of the date of the
payment of the required visa fees.
8 U.S.C. § 1184(d) (1982). Id.; see supra note 33 and accompanying text; see also Hearings on
Marriage Fraud, supra note 3, at 9 (Precedent decisions demand only that a valid marriage
(absent pre-existent fraud or undissolved prior marriages) occur; consummation and cohabita-
tion, viability, and intent at the time the alien applies for "recordation" of lawful admission has
been deemed immaterial.).
67. IMFA § 3(a)(1) (amending INA § 214(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(d) (1982)).
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The Amendments may preclude such action. Because the Attorney
General has discretion to waive the meeting requirement,6 however,
the operation of this provision may not result in a cultural conflict.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS IN THE AMENDMENTS
The Amendments provide additional burdens on the alien seek-
ing to enter or remain in the United States. Although burdensome,
most sections of the Amendments do not pose constitutional ques-
tions. Section 5 of the Amendments does pose such a question.
A. Marriage During Exclusion or Deportation Proceedings
Under the INA, an alien in deportation or exclusion proceedings
could marry an American and obtain immediate relative status.69
The Attorney General could then adjust the status of the alien to that
of permanent resident.7" This decision could be made within the
Attorney General's discretion.71
Through the Amendments, Congress has deprived aliens of the
opportunity to be heard regarding the validity of their marriage. Con-
gress has also deprived the Attorney General of his discretion to
approve petitions for immediate relative status during a deportation
or exclusion proceeding.72 Instead, the alien will be given the oppor-
tunity to depart voluntarily from the United States in lieu of actual
exclusion or deportation.73 At the conclusion of two years, the alien
may then apply for immediate relative status. The bona fides of the
marriage is irrelevant to the decision.
Under section 4 of the Amendments, an alien who "has
attempted or conspired to enter into a marriage for the purpose of
evading the immigration laws" will be barred from immigrating to the
United States.74 Section 5 creates a strong presumption that the alien
who marries while engaged in a judicial or administrative proceeding
.has a fraudulent motive. The two sections read together render the
Amendments procedurally inefficient. The alien facing deportation
or exclusion is already involved in a judicial or administrative pro-
ceeding. If the marriage is found to be fraudulent, section 4 requires
that the alien be perpetually barred from immigrating to the United
68. IMFA § 3(a)(2).
69. INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1982).
70. Id.
71. INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1982).
72. IMFA § 5(a).
73. Id. § 5(b).
74. Id. § 4 (amending § 204(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c) (1982)).
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States.75 If the alien proves that the marriage is valid, the Attorney
General should be able to grant immediate relative status. Requiring
the alien to leave the United States for two years before considering
the validity of the marriage is inefficient and unfair to the alien and his
or her family.
B. Due Process Rights of Aliens
Congress provides two mechanisms for determining an alien's
right to remain in the United States. The exclusion proceeding, 76
which usually occurs at the alien's point of entry, determines an
alien's admissibility into the United States. An alien is inadmissible if
he or she falls under one of thirty-three classes of "excludables." '77
These classes can be grouped into seven categories: immoral aliens,78
politically subversive aliens,79 alien workers possessing employment
skills available domestically, 80 criminal aliens,8 ' physically or men-
tally ill aliens,82 aliens likely to be public charges, 83 and aliens who
have violated admission laws. 84  An alien who has already made a
legal or illegal entry into the United States85 will be subject to a depor-
tation proceeding.8 6 Congress has created eighteen classes of deport-
able aliens, which incorporate the thirty-three classes of excludable
aliens.8 7
75. The effects of this section of the Amendments can already be seen in everyday life.
Probably the first marriage to be affected by the new law is discussed in an article that
appeared in The Washington Post National Weekly Edition. Rebecca and Marco Mejia had
lived together one year before deciding to marry. Marco Mejia had been arrested as an illegal
alien in 1983 and was in the midst of a deportation proceeding. Instead of going on their
honeymoon, the Mejias instead are faced with moving out of the country for two years. Mrs.
Mejia, an American citizen, is a doctoral student at Georgetown University. She will either
have to give up her studies for two years or remain in the United States without her husband.
Walsh, Till Marriage Do Us Part, Wash. Post Nat'l Weekly Ed., Mar. 16, 1987, at 34.
76. INA § 212,8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1982 & Supp. 111985). See generally 1 C. GORDON & H.
ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE ch. 2 (1959).
77. See INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1982 & Supp. 11 1985).
78. See, e.g., INA § 212(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(13) (1982); see also Comment,
Developments in the Law-Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1286, 1339 (1983).
79. See, e.g., INA § 212(a)(28), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28) (1982).
80. See, e.g., INA § 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1982).
81. See, e.g., INA § 212(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (1982).
82. See, e.g., INA § 212(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6) (1982).
83. See, e.g., INA § 212(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(15) (1982).
84. See, e.g., INA § 212(a)(19), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19) (1982).
85. The definition of entry "encompasses every coming of an alien into the United States
from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession." C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD,
supra note 76, at 111. Entry does not have to be legal.
86. INA § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982). See generally IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD,
supra note 76, at ch. 3.
87. See INA § 241(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982).
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Deportation and exclusion proceedings directly impinge on a
person's fundamental right to liberty because they determine an
alien's right to enter or remain in the United States. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court established that aliens are entitled to some degree of
due process. In the Japanese Immigrant Case,8 the Court stated:
[T]his court has never held, nor must we now be understood as
holding, that administrative officers, when executing the provisions
of a statute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fun-
damental principles that inhere in "due process of law" as under-
stood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. One of these
principles is that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without
opportunity, at some time, to be heard, before such officers, in
respect of the matters upon which that liberty depends-not neces-
sarily an opportunity upon a regular, set occasion, and according
to the forms of judicial procedure, but one that will secure the
prompt, vigorous action contemplated by Congress, and at the
same time be appropriate to the nature of the case upon which
such officers are required to act.89
Because admission to the United States is a privilege granted by
the sovereign government, 90 the Supreme Court has consistently
upheld Congress's plenary power to make rules and policies regarding
an alien's right to enter or remain in the United States.9" This power
may be delegated to the Executive branch.92 Courts will refrain from
looking behind discretionary action if the power is exercised "on the
basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason."'9 In exclusion
88. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
89. Id. at 100-01.
90. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); see also Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
91. In Kleindienst v. Mandel, the Court stated that Congress's plenary power to make
rules and policies regarding the right of an alien to enter or remain in the United States has
long been established. 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972).
92. 408 U.S. at 770.
93. Id. Mandel was a Belgian author and a self-proclaimed "revolutionary marxist." The
INS denied Mandel's application for a temporary visa on the grounds that he was excludable
under section 212(a)(28). Mandel then sought a waiver, which was also denied. A group of
United States citizens brought an action to "enforce their [First Amendment] rights [to hear
Mandel speak], individually and as members of the American public." Id. at 762. The Court
held, even in the face of a first amendment claim by United States citizens, the judiciary would
not review a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" for exclusion. Id. The Court reiterated
this reasoning in Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). In Fiallo, the Court once again stated that
"over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is
over" the admission of aliens. Id. at 792 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766
(1972); Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)); see also Shaughnessy
v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) (The power to exclude aliens is a fundamental sovereign
power to be exercised by the political departments of the government.). The Court went on to
state that Congress's exclusion of the relationship between an illegitimate child and his father
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proceedings, "whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is
due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned." '94 Courts
have announced a similar view with respect to deportation
proceedings:
The power to expel aliens, being essentially a power of the political
branches of government, the legislative and executive, may be exer-
cised entirely through executive officers, "with such opportunity
for judicial review of their action as Congress may see fit to author-
ize or permit." This power is, of course, subject to judicial inter-
vention under the "paramount law of the Constitution. '"
Aliens in exclusion proceedings are entitled to notification of the
hearing date and of their right to counsel.96 At the proceeding, the
immigration judge97 must inform the alien of the charges against him.
The judge must also reiterate the right to counsel and the availability
of free legal services," although not at the government's expense. The
alien may present evidence and cross-examine witnesses,9 9 and can
appeal an adverse decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals. °0
Because deportation proceedings are instituted against aliens
who have already made an entry into the United States and have
established ties to the country, these proceedings must comport with
the fifth amendment guarantee of due process. 101 At the same time,
is a legislative policy decision. "It is clear from our cases ... that these are policy questions
entrusted exclusively to the political branches of our Government, and we have no judicial
authority to substitute our political judgment for that of the Congress." Fiallo, 430 U.S. at
798.
94. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 544; see also Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953). In
Mathews v. Diaz, the Court stated:
There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United
States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects
every one of these persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful,
involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection.
The fact that all persons, aliens and citizens alike, are protected by the Due
Process Clause does not lead to the further conclusion that all aliens are entitled
to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship or, indeed, to the conclusion that all
aliens must be placed in a single homogeneous legal classification. For a host of
constitutional and statutory provisions rest on the premise that a legitimate
distinction between citizens and aliens may justify attributes and benefits for one
class not accorded to the other.
426 U.S. 67, 77-78 (1976) (citations omitted).
95. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952).
96. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.6(a) (1987).
97. The role of the immigration judge is questionable given the fact that most immigration
judges are former INS officers. See Comment, supra note 80.
98. See 8 C.F.R. § 236.2(a) (1987).
99. Id.
100. See INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (1982).
101. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).
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deportation proceedings are civil, not criminal in nature; the proce-
dural protections are limited as compared to those afforded persons in
criminal proceedings. 102 Because Congress has been given such a
broad range of power over immigration, "[t]he role of the judiciary is
limited to determining whether the procedures meet the essential
standard of fairness under the Due Process Clause and does not
extend to imposing procedures that merely displace congressional
choices of policy."'' 3 Under the INA, the alien must be given reason-
able notice of the hearing, may be represented by counsel, and may
present 'evidence and cross-examine witnesses. 1"' The alien is not
entitled to counsel at the government's expense.0 5 Most importantly,
the deportable alien has the burden of proof regarding the legality of
his or her entry." 6
Section 5 of the Amendments does not directly interfere with the
procedural due process afforded aliens in these proceedings. The alien
receives notice of the hearing and of the right to counsel. The alien
may present evidence and cross-examine witnesses regarding the
deportable offense, and the alien may appeal the decision.
The alien may not, however, use the benefit of the marriage to
suspend deportation. Because the Amendments conclusively presume
the marriage is fraudulent, the alien is denied the opportunity to
prove its validity. The alien is in proceedings because he or she has
been charged with a deportable offense. The validity of the marriage
is not directly related to that offense but is crucial to a determination
of the alien's right to enter or remain in the United States.
Application of this provision may result in a violation of the
alien's right to procedural due process because it creates a presump-
tion of marriage fraud that may not be rebutted by the alien. Con-
versely, the provision may simply evidence a substantive change in
congressional policy in the area of immigration. °7 Congress has ple-
nary power over immigration policy, and marriage to an American
may no longer be a basis for suspension of deportation. The govern-
ment will be quick to point out that Congress could abolish preferen-
tial treatment altogether for immediate relatives of American citizens
and/or lawful permanent residents. Instead, it has chosen an argua-
bly more moderate form of policing immigration. The prevalence of
102. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952).
103. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34-35 (1982).
104. See INA § 242(b)(1)-(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1)-(3) (1982); 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(b) (1987).
105. See INA § 242(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (1982); 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(a) (1987).
106. See INA § 291, 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982).
107. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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immigration-related marriage fraud may provide the rational basis for
section 5.
1. THE BALANCING TEST
If an alien brings a procedural due process challenge against sec-
tion 5, the courts will utilize the balancing test set out in Mathews v.
Eldridge,0 8 to determine the validity of section 5. Under this test, the
Court must weigh:
1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally 3) the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and adminis-
trative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.109
The Court applied the Mathews balancing test in Cleveland
Board of Education v. Loudermill.1 °  A dismissed municipal
employee alleged a deprivation of a property interest in his job with-
out due process.III The Court held that a pretermination hearing was
essential when the competing interests at stake were balanced. 1 2 The
competing interests in Loudermill were "the private interest in retain-
ing employment, the governmental interest in the expeditious
removal of unsatisfactory employees and the avoidance of administra-
tive burdens, and the risk of an erroneous termination."'' 1 3
Section 5 of the Amendments thrusts strong competing interests
to the forefront. Both the alien and American spouse have strong pri-
vate interests in remaining together as a family unit in the United
States. The American spouse seeks to protect his fundamental right
108. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The plaintiff in Mathews brought the action to determine
whether the fifth amendment due process clause requires that recipients of Social Security
disability benefits be afforded the right to an evidentiary hearing before termination of such
benefits. The Court held that requiring such a hearing would create administrative burdens
that would far outweigh benefits to the recipients. Id. at 348-49.
109. Id. at 335.
110. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
111. Loudermill had been hired by the Cleveland Board of Education as a security guard.
On his job application, Loudermill stated that he had never been convicted of a felony. After
Loudermill had been hired, the Board discovered that he had been convicted of grand larceny
and promptly dismissed Loudermill without affording him an opportunity to respond to the
charges. Under Ohio state law, Loudermill was classified as a civil servant, and as such could
only be terminated for good cause. The Supreme Court held that under the Ohio statute,
Loudermill had a property right in his employment and thus had been deprived of his right to
property without constitutionally adequate procedures. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538-40.
112. Id. at 542.
113. Id. at 542-43.
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to marry and still reside in his country. The government has a strong
interest in retaining its control over immigration and in preventing
marriage fraud. The "risk of erroneous deprivation" may be great
because families are forced to live apart for two years. Others might
view the risk of deprivation as minimal because the majority of aliens
who marry during proceedings have fraudulent motives. This view
may be balanced by the minimal degree of administrative burdens
because the alien is already involved in proceedings. In fact, the
Amendments increase the administrative burden because they require
the alien to prove the validity of the marriage two years later in a
different forum.
If the courts view the competing interests under section 5 as at
least equal, the alien may be entitled to a validity hearing before leav-
ing the country. If the courts view the governmental interest in
preventing marriage fraud as more compelling, the alien will be
required to leave. Given the deference the courts have always given
Congress in the control of immigration, the courts will probably
uphold section 5 against a procedural due process challenge.
2. THE IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION DOCTRINE
A hybrid of the procedural due process argument, which has
fallen into disuse in the courts, is the irrebuttable presumption doc-
trine. This doctrine combines procedural due process and equal pro-
tection to argue that the failure to individualize classifications may
result in procedural insufficiencies.
Justice Stewart enunciated the doctrine in Cleveland Board of
Education v. LaFleur,114 where the Court held that a school board
regulation requiring pregnant teachers to take an unpaid maternity
leave five months before the expected delivery date violated due pro-
cess. " '5 According to the Court, the regulation created an irrebut-
table presumption that pregnant teachers who are four or five months
pregnant are incapable of teaching beyond that point.1 6 The Court
held that the conclusive presumption was both arbitrary and irra-
tional in that it did not exhibit a valid relationship to the state's inter-
est in providing continuity of education." 7
Section 5 also creates an irrebuttable presumption; marriages
entered into during proceedings are fraudulent. Unlike aliens who
114. 414 U.S. 632 (1974); see also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (Connecticut
statute created an irrebuttable presumption in denying reduced tuition fees to students
transferring from out of state).
115. 414 U.S. at 651.
116. Id. at 641.
117. Id. at 647-48.
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marry before the institution of proceedings (which may be the result
of luck and nothing more), the alien subject to deportation or exclu-
sion proceedings is not given the opportunity to prove the validity of
the marriage and remain in the United States.
The irrebuttable presumption doctrine, however, contains an
inherent flaw. Virtually every regulation creates a classification that
irrebuttably presumes the problem the regulation seeks to remedy
exists. Courts cannot invalidate every law. The question should turn
on the degree to which the presumption affects the regulation. For
this reason, the Court limited the doctrine in Weinburger v. Salfi.118
The facts of Salfi are particularly analogous to those presented by
section 5.
Under the Social Security Act, the spouse of a wage earner was
not eligible to receive benefits if the parties had not been married for
at least nine months prior to the wage earner's death.II9 The Act did
not permit the spouse to prove the marriage was not entered into
solely to obtain social security benefits.1 20 In holding the durational
requirement constitutional, the Supreme Court stated:
The question is whether Congress, its concern having been reason-
ably aroused by the possibility of an abuse which it legitimately
desired to avoid, could rationally have concluded both that a par-
ticular limitation or qualification would protect against its occur-
rence, and that the expense and other difficulties of individual
determinations justified the inherent imprecision of a prophylactic
rule. We conclude the duration-of-relationship test meets this con-
stitutional standard. 121
Given the similarities between the regulation in Salf! and that in
section 5, Congress can make a compelling argument that it has acted
rationally in requiring the alien to leave for two years. This require-
ment severely limits occurrences of marriage fraud. The argument
loses its strength, however, when balanced against the minimal degree
of expense and difficulty in providing individual determinations. The
aliens are already in judicial or administrative proceedings. To permit
the alien to prove the validity of the marriage would not unreasonably
burden those proceedings.
Furthermore, the regulation in Salfi did not intrude on the mari-
tal relationship to the same degree as does section 5. The Salfi regula-
tions limited the financial benefits which may be derived from
118. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
119. Id. at 754.
120. Id. at 784-85.
121. Id. at 777.
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marriages entered into less than nine months before the wage earner's
death, did not interfere with the marriage itself. In contrast, section 5
affects the marital relationship directly. The American spouse must
leave with the alien, remain in the United States alone, or divorce the
alien spouse.
Courts, however, might have another justification for applying
the irrebuttable presumption doctrine. In rejecting the doctrine in
Salf!, the Court distinguished Lafleur and Viandis v. Kline,'22 which
struck down irrebuttable presumptions, on the ground that those
cases did not involve a noncontractual claim to receive funds from the
public treasury.' 23 Such claims to government benefits do not enjoy
constitutionally protected status.
124
Courts may be able to limit the application of Salfi to claims that
only involve monetary government benefits and resurrect the irrebut-
table presumption doctrine. Although section 5 also grants a govern-
ment benefit, it is not monetary in nature. Furthermore, the
conclusive presumption in section 5 is crucial to the proceedings and
has a direct effect on the alien's right to enter or remain in the United
States. Accordingly, courts may find use of the doctrine both appro-
priate and meritorious.
B. Equal Protection
The equal protection doctrine requires that persons in similar cir-
cumstances be treated alike.'25 Courts, therefore, attempt to restrict
legislative action that classifies persons in a manner not bearing a
"fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose." '126
Under an equal protection analysis of section 5, courts must first
determine if aliens who marry during proceedings and aliens who
marry before the initiation of such proceedings are similarly situated.
Precedent indicates that all aliens are not similarly situated merely
because they fall under the general class of "aliens."
In Mathews v. Diaz,127 a subclass of aliens raised an equal protec-
tion argument based on their right to receive the same supplemental
medical insurance as American citizens and resident aliens who had
122. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
123. Salfi, 422 U.S. at 772.
124. Id.
125. Equal protection claims against state regulations are brought under the fourteenth
amendment. Equal protection claims against discriminatory federal regulations must be
brought under the due process clause of the fifth amendment. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV
§ 1; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 215, 216 (1982).
126. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216.
127. 426 U.S. 67 (1976); see supra note 108.
1108
MARRIAGE FRAUD
lived in the United States for five years. 28 These aliens did not qual-
ify under the five year residency requirement. In addressing the equal
protection argument, the Court stated that "the class of aliens is itself
a heterogeneous multitude of persons with a wide-ranging variety of
ties to this country."1 29 The Court stressed that Congress has chosen
to provide certain benefits to some aliens; Congress is not required to
provide those same benefits to all aliens. 3' Aliens who marry during
proceedings and aliens who marry before proceedings, however, may
be similarly situated for other reasons than merely alienage. Both
classes of aliens marry an American citizen or permanent resident.
Under the Amendments, one class is given the opportunity to prove
the validity of the qualifying marriage; one class is not.
If the classes are similarly situated, courts must apply at least a
"rational basis" test to determine the validity of section 5. Under this
analysis, Congress must show that the differential classification bears
a "fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose."' 3'1 Few persons
would argue with the supposition that controlling immigration and
deterring marriage fraud are legitimate public interests. The question
remains if the presumption of fraud created by section 5 fairly relates
to those interests.
The rational basis test requires minimal judicial scrutiny, partic-
ularly in the field of immigration law.13 2 "Rational" is defined as
"having reason or understanding."'' 3 The courts will construe the
provision as valid if Congress can proffer a "reason" to differentiate
between aliens who marry before proceedings and those who marry
during proceedings. In Mathews, the Court stated that Congress must
draw some line regarding aliens who may receive welfare benefits. 3
4
Congress made a policy decision based on the character and duration
of an alien's residence in the United States. 1' The Court stated:
[I]t remains true that some line is essential, that any line must pro-
duce some harsh and apparently arbitrary consequences, and, of
greatest importance, that those who qualify under the test Con-
gress has chosen may reasonably be presumed to have greater affin-
ity with the United States than those who do not.'3 6
The Mathews court viewed the line drawn by Congress as a difference
128. Mathews, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
129. Id. at 78-79.
130. Id. at 82-83.
131. Id. at 83.
132. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
133. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1885 (1981)
134. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 83.
135. Id. at 84.
136. Id.
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in degree and not a difference in character of the respective claims.137
Accordingly, the Court would not substitute its judgment for that of
Congress. 138
It may be argued that Congress made a similar policy decision in
enacting section 5 of the Amendments. The difference between the
eligible and ineligible is a difference of degree: those who marry
before proceedings begin and those who do not. It is not surprising
that Congress would presume that aliens who marry during proceed-
ings have fraudulent motives. Aliens in proceedings are allegedly in
the United States illegally or fall into an "undesirable" category. Fur-
thermore, deported aliens are barred from re-entering the United
States for at least five years,139 which may provide a greater incentive
to commit fraud. These reasons, however, should not automatically
provide a basis for differentiating between the two classes of aliens.
Under the Amendments, both classes of aliens have the burden
of proof regarding the validity of the marriage. In essence, Congress
has presumed all immigration-related marriages are fraudulent; the
only difference being one class may prove the validity of the marriage
and one may not. Congress should be required to justify the differen-
tial classification. A review of the Amendment's legislative history
provides no assistance. The government does not offer any statistics
indicating that aliens in proceedings commit marriage fraud more
often than aliens not in proceedings. If the government can provide
such information, courts will find the "rational basis" for the regula-
tion. Without substantial evidence courts may still uphold the classi-
fication as rational out of deference to continued political control over
immigration.
There are specific instances, however, in which courts may apply
a strict scrutiny review to regulations that differentiate between simi-
larly situated persons. The Supreme Court of the United States has
held classifications that disadvantage a "suspect class"' or inhibit
137. Id. at 80-81.
138. See supra note 103.
139. INA § 212(a)(17), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(17) (1982). Section 212(a)(17) reads as follows:
(17) Aliens who have been arrested and deported, or who have fallen into
distress and have been removed pursuant to this chapter or any prior act, or who
have been removed as alien enemies, or who have been removed at Government
expense in lieu of deportation pursuant to section 1252(b) of this title, and who
seek admission within five years of the date of such deportation or removal,
unless prior to their embarkation or reembarkation at a place outside the United
States or their attempt to be admitted from foreign contiguous territory the
Attorney General has consented to their applying or reapplying for admission.
8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(17) (1982).
140. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 215, 216 n.14.
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the exercise of a fundamental right to be presumptively invidious and
warrant strict scrutiny review. 14
1
1. SUSPECT CLASSES
"Suspect" classifications encompass classifications based on race
and nationality. 142 Such classifications strike at the very heart of this
country's political system and are "irrelevant" to any permissible gov-
ernment objective.143 "Distinctions between citizens solely because of
their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality." 1"
The Court has developed a similar, if less strict, approach to clas-
sifications based on alienage. 145  Most state classifications based on
alienage are constitutionally suspect and warrant strict scrutiny
review. 146 Certain state regulations that are political in nature, how-
ever, may be exceptions because of legitimate state objectives.' 47
The Supreme Court has never held that federal classifications
based on alienage are "suspect" or "irrelevant" to any permissible
141. Id. at 216-17.
142. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (Florida statute prohibiting an
unmarried interracial couple from living together violated equal protection); Oyama v.
California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (California statute prohibiting ownership of property based on
parent's country of origin violated equal protection).
143. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (citations omitted).
144. Id.
145. See generally Comment Aliens and the Federal Government: A Newer Equal
Protection, 8 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (1975).
146. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (New York civil service statute
providing that only United States citizens may hold civil service positions violated equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973)
(Connecticut state statute prohibiting resident aliens from practicing law because of state
citizenship requirement violated equal protection); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971) (Arizona statute denying welfare benefits to resident aliens who have not resided in the
United States for 15 years violated equal protection); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334
U.S. 410 (1948) (California statute denying issuance of fishing licenses to persons ineligible to
citizenship' violated equal protection). In Takahashi, the Court stated:
The Federal Government has broad constitutional powers in determining what
aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period they may remain,
regulation of their conduct before naturalization, and the terms and conditions of
their naturalization. Under the Constitution the states are granted no such
powers; they can neither add to nor take from the conditions lawfully imposed by
Congress upon admission, naturalization and residence of aliens in the United
States or the several states. State laws which impose discriminatory burdens
upon the entrance or residence of aliens lawfully within the United States conflict
with this constitutionally derived federal power to regulate immigration, and
have accordingly been held invalid.
Id. at 419 (citation omitted).
147. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (state restriction that requires "peace
officers" to be United States citizens serves a political function and is not subject to strict
scrutiny).
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federal objective. Indeed, the federal government has been given ple-
nary power to make such classifications. 148 The Court, in Hampton v.
Mow Sun -Wong,14 9 however, did invalidate a federal regulation
promulgated by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which barred
noncitizens from employment in the civil service. In so doing, the
Court did not apply strict scrutiny review but rather focused on the
illegitimacy of the regulation.' ° The Court may have acted more
favorable to the federal government if the CSC had been directly
responsible for protecting the national interests asserted or if Con-
gress or the President had expressly mandated the regulation.15 1
Aliens who marry during proceedings are not a "suspect" class
for purposes of reviewing federal legislation. The Court in Hampton
indicated that it would not have invalidated the CSC regulation had it
been promulgated by Congress or the President. Congress has both
promulgated the Amendments and asserted the compelling national
interest in protecting the borders through the deterrence of marriage
fraud.
2. RIGHT TO MARRIAGE AND FAMILY ASSOCIATION
Although aliens are not a "suspect" class, the courts may still
apply strict scrutiny review to section 5 because Congress is imping-
ing on the American spouse's fundamental right to marry. Section 5
forces the American who marries an alien to leave the United States
for two years or remain irf the United States without his spouse.
Court decisions involving the constitutional right to marry find their
origins in Loving v. Virginia, 52 in which the Supreme Court held a
148. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
149. 426 U.S. 88 (1975).
150. Id. at 103. The Court stated that some form of judicial scrutiny is constitutionally
mandated when a federal rule deprives a specific class of persons of their right to liberty. Id.
The Court did not require strict scrutiny review. In the Hampton litigation subsequent to the
Supreme Court decision, the district court stated that "[w]hereas a state must show a
compelling governmental interest to sustain a law discriminating against noncitizens, judicial
review of federal enactments regarding alienage and immigration is narrow." Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, 435 F. Supp. 37, 42-43 (N.D. Cal. 1977), affid sub nom. Mow Sun Wong v.
Campbell, 626 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
151. Hampton, 426 U.S. at 116. The Court concluded:
Since these residents were admitted as a result of decisions made by the Congress
and the President, implemented by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
acting under the Attorney General of the United States, due process requires that
the decision to impose that deprivation of an important liberty be made either at
a comparable level of government or, if it is to be permitted to be made by the
Civil Service Commission, that it be justified by reasons which are properly the
concern of that agency.
Id.
152. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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Virginia statute unconstitutional because it forbade "any white person
in [the] state to marry any save a white person, or a person with no
other admixture of blood than white and American Indian."'15 3  In
Griswold v. Connecticut,54 the Court held that a Connecticut statute
forbidding the use of contraceptives violates the fundamental right of
marital privacy, a right within that penumbra of guarantees provided
by the Bill of Rights. The Court stated:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights---older
than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage
is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring,
and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not polit-
ical faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in
our prior decisions.' 55
The Court quoted both Loving and Griswold in Zablocki v.
Redhail,156 upholding the constitutional right to marry as a funda-
mental liberty protected by the due process clause. The Court went
on to state that "[w]hen a statutory classification significantly inter-
feres with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld
unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is
closely tailored to effectuate those interests."'
' 57
In writing the opinion for the Court, Justice Marshall was care-
ful to clarify the Court's holding. Every state regulation that "relates
in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage" will not
be subject to strict scrutiny. 5 1 Only those regulations that have a
direct and substantial impact on the right to marry will be strictly
scrutinized.' 59
The Seventh Circuit has held that state or local regulations are
not unconstitutional violations of the right of family association
"unless they regulate the family directly."'" The collateral conse-
quences of regulations not directed at the family, such as regulations
153. Id. at 5 n.4.
154. 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
155. Id. at 486.
156. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
157. Id. at 388; see also Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 607 (D.C.Cir. 1983) ("The
Constitution requires that there be more than a determination that the Federal 'interest' would
be marginally advanced by taking action in a particular case; there must be a showing that the
governmental interest would be promoted in ways sufficiently substantial to warrant overriding
basic human liberties.").
158. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386.
159. Id. at 387.
160. Hameetman v. City of Chicago, 776 F.2d 636, 643 (7th Cir. 1985).
1987]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1087
designed to keep illegal aliens out of the country, do not bring the
constitutional rights of family association into play. 6 '
Section 5 does not forbid an American citizen to marry an alien,
and thus it may be argued that this section of the Amendments does
not regulate marriage or family association directly. The Amend-
ments may, however, force a de facto deportation of the American
spouse because the spouse is given the option to remain in the United
States alone or leave with the alien.
The courts have rejected the de facto deportation argument in
situations analogous to section 5. In Newton v. INS,6 2 the Sixth Cir-
cuit held the deportation of alien parents of children who were Ameri-
can citizens did not violate the children's constitutional rights of
citizenship.' 63 In so holding, the court stated that the children
would always be United States citizens, who upon reaching the age of
majority, could decide to return to the United States."' The court
also noted that the deportation order did not require the aliens to take
their children with them. 6
5
Section 5 operates in a similar manner. The American spouse
will always retain his or her citizenship and may return to the United
States at any time. Furthermore, requiring the alien to leave does not
specifically require the American spouse to leave. The government can
argue that any marriage between two persons may cause the reloca-
tion of one of the spouses. Section 5 requires no more. The govern-
ment's argument, however, is flawed in one respect. Married couples
usually relocate to obtain benefits or further careers. Section 5
requires relocation of the spouse in order to retain a right-the right
161. Id.
162. 736 F.2d 336 (6th Cir. 1984); see also Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1977);
Mendez v. Major, 340 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1965). In Acosta, the Court elucidated the reasoning
for its conclusion:
It is the fundamental right of an American citizen to reside wherever he wishes,
whether in the United States or abroad, and to engage in the consequent travel.
It is the right to exercise choice of residence, not an obligation to remain in one's
native country whether one so desires or not, as is required in some totalitarian
countries.
Acosta, 558 F.2d at 1157. The Eighth Circuit in Mendez voiced a similar viewpoint:
There can be no doubt that Congress has the power to determine the conditions
under which an alien may enter and remain in the United States ... even though
the conditions may impose a certain amount of hardship upon an alien's wife or
children.
Mendez, 340 F.2d at 131-32.
163. Newton, 736 F.2d at 343.
164. Id. at 342-43.
165. Id. at 343.
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to marry. Section 5 may not directly regulate the right to marry, but
it does directly interfere with that right.
3. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT VS. COMPELLING
GOVERNMENT INTEREST
If the courts were to construe section 5 as impinging on the
American spouse's fundamental right to marry, then the government
must show that its classification of aliens under this section "has been
precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest."' 66 It
is well-established that Congress and the President have virtually
unrestricted power over immigration and naturalization. 67 Control
over the influx of immigrants and nonimmigrants has always been a
compelling national interest. The concern over immigration-related
marriage fraud is a necessary corollary to that interest. Courts must
analyze section 5, however, to determine if the requirement that
aliens who marry during proceedings leave for two years has been
precisely tailored to serve the government's interest in deterring mar-
riage fraud. In so doing, the Court will not apply a strict scrutiny
review. Because of the deferrence given Congress in the area of immi-
gration, the Court instead will follow the Hampton analysis and look
to the legitimacy of the regulation.
Under section 5, Congress requires an alien who marries while
facing exclusion or deportation from the United States to remain
outside the country for two years. Without the benefit of marriage to
an American, the alien might face exclusion or deportation for a mini-
mum of five years. Because Congress allows the alien to return to the
United States after two years, as opposed to five years if the alien is
deported, courts will find that Congress has addressed marriage fraud
in a both a reasonable and legitimate manner.
IV. CONCLUSION
Immigration-related marriage fraud evokes cries of concern from
the INS, Congress and its constituents. The Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendments represent a direct response to these concerns.
Sections two through four address the concerns in a rational or legiti-
mate manner. Section two requires a two year conditional residency
period for aliens who marry (or have been married for less than two
years) as of November 6, 1986. The conditional period imposes no
additional hardships. Aliens may work and receive benefits. More-
166. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217.
167. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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over, the conditional period will not affect the alien's eligibility for
citizenship. Section three requires that aliens and their spouses have
met in person within the last two years before the INS will grant a
fiance visa. Because the Attorney General may waive this require-
ment, the Amendments will not interfere with cultural beliefs or prac-
tices. Furthermore, Congress is within its power to permanently bar
aliens who attempt to fraudulently enter or remain in the United
States through marriage to an American citizen or lawful permanent
resident.
Congress will face its greatest challenge in the courts in defense
of section five. Aliens who marry during judicial or administrative
proceedings and those who marry before such proceedings are simi-
larly situated. Both classes attempt to enter or remain in the United
States by marrying an American. In denying one group of aliens the
opportunity to prove the validity of the marriage, Congress has vio-
lated the alien's right to procedural due process and equal protection
under the law.
The courts will probably find a "rational basis" for denying the
alien the opportunity to be heard. The courts should find, however,
that section five violates the American spouse's constitutional right to
marry because it is a direct and substantial interference of that right.
Nonetheless, the courts most likely will conclude that Congress has a
compelling interest in controlling immigration. This interest will out-
weigh any violation of individual rights.
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